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Get ready for the next influenza pandemic ! 
The influenza virus is unique in its ability to cause 
sudden mild to severe infection in all age groups and 
on a global scale. The morbidity and mortality associ- 
ated with each annual epidemic, particularly among the 
elderly and those with underlying conditions, have 
justified annual ininiunization progranis targeted at the 
high-risk groups in European countries and in North 
America. However, this very common infection is 
often not considered to be of high priority in many 
other countries, particularly the less-developed ones. 
Hecause of the ability of the virus to undergo sudden 
antigenic change, novel strains to which the entire 
population is susceptible and for which the current 
vaccine is not effective can emerge at any time. Three 
pandemics corresponding to the emergence of a new 
influenza A virus have occurred during this century: 
The Spanish flu of 2918 to 3919 (subtype H I N ~ )  killed 
niore people than World War I (20 to 40 million lives 
were taken by this pandemic [I]) ;  the Asian flu of 1957 
(H2Nz); and the Hong Kong flu (H3Nz) of 1968. There 
was also a pseudo-pandemic in 1977 caused by the 
reappearance of HlNl .  If the last two pandeniics (1957 
and 1968) had a less severe impact than the Spanish 
flu of 1918 to 1919, their consequences were far 
from negligible in terms of morbidity, mortality, social 
disruption and economic loss. Since the appearance of 
the 1968 H3N2 strain, no new subtype has emerged; 
the currently circulating viruses are variants of H I  N1 
and H.\Nz. 
Although it is not possible to predict the next 
occurrence of a pandemic, each year brings such an 
event closer 11 I .  lluring the last few years, the threat of 
the next pandemic has received increasing attention 
from physicians and scientists followed by international 
and national public health authorities. During an 
international meeting i n  Berlin in 1993, the subject was 
extensively debated and recommendations were made 
to the various Ministries of Public Health, influenza 
vaccine niatiufacturers, researchers and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva [21. The 
reconiniendations included a request for each country 
t o  develop an influenza pandemic-preparedness plan 
and to establish a national committee to oversee pan- 
demic national activities. Since that nieeting, several 
countries (including the United Kingdom, France, 
Belgium, Canada, the United States and Romania) 
have either developed or are developing a national plan, 
and the WHO has initiated an international co- 
ordination program. 
In the US in 1976, the swine influenza story [3] 
led to a national immunization campaign based on the 
experts’ fears of a deadly epidemic. However, this 
emergency program was not followed by the expected 
swine flu epidemic, but by an outbreak of Guillain- 
Barrtt syndrome caused by the new, hastily produced, 
vaccine. The failure of this large-scale intervention 
illustrates well the limitations of emergency programs 
implemented in the absence of proper planning and 
preparedness, both of which should address the tech- 
nical, social, political and administrative issues. The 
lessons learned from this episode further substantiate 
the need for national planning and preparedness as 
recommended at the Berlin meeting [2]. However, 
many epidemiological, scientific, niedical and technical 
problems remain unsolved and niay not be solved by 
the time that the next pandemic occurs. 
A recent meeting (11 to 13 Ileceniber 199S), 
sponsored by the National Institute of Health, lkthesda, 
MU, has provided an opportunity for a large number 
of international experts (for example, virologists, clirii- 
cians, epideniiologists, public health officials, vaccine 
manufacturers, antiviral nianufactuers and regulating 
national institutions) to discuss further such a world- 
wide public health threat and challenge. This meeting 
aimed to improve the global surveillance of the 
enicrgence of pandemic strains, nionitoriiig of the 
impact of virus spread and the ways that surveillance 
data can be used to control a pandemic; addressed the 
imniunological and niolecular aspects of pandemic 
influenza; discussed vaccine issues such as the most 
appropriate type of vaccine, timing of the production 
and control of a pandemic vaccine, priority populations 
to target for immunization, new promising area5 of 
vaccine research that niay be useful for a pandemic, and 
the usefulness and constraints of using antivirals to 
control a pandemic. 
The international surveillance of the influenza 
virus under the auspices of the W H O  has, in two 
decades, improved considerably the timely recognition 
of new variants 111. Over 100 national laboratories 
participate in this surveillance and refer new isolates 
to three collaborating centers (London, Atlanta and 
Melbourne) for further characterization. However, 
these 100 laboratories are not distributed equally around 
the world; areas such as China, Asia, Africa and Latin 
America are insufficiently represented or not covered at  
all. Although, in theory, the next pandemic subtype can 
emerge froni anywhere, current knowledge of the 
ecology of the influenza virus suggest that the pandemic 
epicenter is located in Asia and, niore specifically, in 
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China. In this country, the interaction between poultry, 
horses, pigs and humans facilitate interspecies virus 
transmission. Thus, sudden antigenic ‘shifts’ of the HA 
and NA of type A influenza viruses may occur through 
reassortment with gene segments of animal viruses 
during random coinfection, particularly with pigs. The 
new strain transmitted from pigs to humans can be 
spread from person to person. The speed of modern 
transportation can then rapidly achieve worldwide dis- 
semination of this virus, to which the entire population 
is susceptible. Because the most important goal of 
influenza surveillance is to identify new subtypes as 
soon as possible to initiate the prompt development of 
an appropriate vaccine, the most likely areas of emer- 
gence of variants should be targeted as a priority. 
O n  the basis of this assumption, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has initiated a 
collaborative program with the Chinese authorities (six 
influenza laboratories have been funded by the CDC 
in China). However, it must be acknowledged that 
other rural areas in other parts of the world also meet 
the conditions favoring the emergence of new subtypes 
and remain unprepared [1]. 
In addition to international virus monitoring 
through a network of national reference centers, the 
surveillance of the disease (morbidity) in Europe and 
the US is carried out through various surveillance 
systems that usually use ‘sentinel’ physicians. Flu-like 
illnesses, either alone or in conjunction with virus 
isolation, are monitored weekly by these surveillance 
systems, usually between October and April. Outbreaks 
can then be detected in time and the characteristics 
of the spread of influenza monitored. However, few 
surveillance systems are able to assess, in a timely fashion, 
the impact on mortality and severe morbidity (for 
example, the hospitalization rate). In the course of a 
pandemic, such information becomes essential, as well as 
knowledge of the inimunization coverage, assessnient of 
the clinical efficacy of the vaccine and use of prophylaxis. 
With the emergence of a novel strain, and depend- 
ing on when and where, it is likely that an effective 
vaccine will not be available in time: 12 weeks are 
necessary to characterize and prepare the strain, and an 
adhtional 9 weeks are needed to produce the first doses 
of the vaccine. Control procedures and evaluation of the 
vaccine, even if reduced as much as possible, may 
further increase the delay. Because only attenuated 
vaccines prepared in embryonated eggs are licensed, the 
amount of available eggs may also be a limiting factor. 
Thus, even when a vaccine is available, the amount 
may be limited, leading to the difficult question of 
who should receive it first (the usual risk groups, the 
most essential people to society as a whole or the 
children, because they transmit the virus to adults?). 
Other questions include: How should the vaccine be 
distributed and administered, and what about the 
countries that do not produce the vaccine, but who 
request it from countries that do? Whether these 
questions have been addressed in advance will be 
critical for the management of the response to a 
pandemic. Other measures to limit as much as possible 
the excess morbidity and mortality caused by a new 
virus include: non-specific means that may be helpful 
in slowing the progress of the pandemic, such as closure 
of public places and schools, and limitation of travel; 
appropriate management of influenza complications; 
and antiviral prophylaxis. In the literature, a large 
number of reports have demonstrated that rimantadine 
or amantadine as prophylaxis is 70 to 90% effective in 
reducing clinical influenza. However, when used as 
treatment, these agents induce drug resistance. If 
prophylaxis is widely used, adverse effects, particularly 
neurological side-effects, have to be considered. The 
use of antiviral prophylaxis varies greatly from country 
to country; for example, the practice is nearly absent in 
Europe because rimantadine is not licensed and/or not 
marketed, and the availability of amantadine is 
restricted to only small amounts. In addition, the 
pandemic plans elaborated so far often contain no firm 
recommendations concerning the use of antiviral 
prophylaxis. Many unresolved prophylaxis issues need 
to be explored further: a consensus in terms of their 
role during a pandemic; availability, production and 
storage of appropriate amounts; clarification of the 
priority targets (as for the vaccine); susceptibility of 
the pandemic strain to antiviral drugs; availability of 
protocols; and what to expect from new antiviral drugs 
that are undergoing development. 
The plans being inipleniented by many countries 
address all of these issues, and emphasize the impor- 
tance of coordination and communication. Global 
surveillance of the influenza virus is essential for the 
timely application of all the preventive measures avail- 
able. However, many scientific, technical and political 
problems are far from being solved. The next inter- 
national scientific meeting on influenza, to be held in 
Autralia in June 1996, will be the next opportunity to 
monitor the progress of the preparedness and planning 
efforts initiated at both national and international levels. 
Jean- Claude Desenclos 
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